oci_spec/runtime/capability.rs
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use serde::{
de::{Deserializer, Error},
Deserialize, Serialize,
};
use std::collections::HashSet;
use strum_macros::{Display, EnumString};
/// Capabilities is a unique set of Capability values.
pub type Capabilities = HashSet<Capability>;
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, EnumString, Eq, Display, Hash, PartialEq, Serialize)]
/// All available capabilities.
///
/// For the purpose of performing permission checks, traditional UNIX
/// implementations distinguish two categories of processes: privileged
/// processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred to as superuser or root),
/// and unprivileged processes (whose effective UID is nonzero). Privileged
/// processes bypass all kernel permission checks, while unprivileged processes
/// are subject to full permission checking based on the process's credentials
/// (usually: effective UID, effective GID, and supplementary group list).
///
/// Starting with kernel 2.2, Linux divides the privileges traditionally
/// associated with superuser into distinct units, known as capabilities, which
/// can be independently enabled and disabled. Capabilities are a per-thread attribute.
#[strum(serialize_all = "SCREAMING_SNAKE_CASE")]
pub enum Capability {
#[serde(rename = "CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL")]
/// Enable and disable kernel auditing; change auditing filter rules;
/// retrieve auditing status and filtering rules.
///
/// _since Linux 2.6.11_
AuditControl,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_AUDIT_READ")]
/// Allow reading the audit log via multicast netlink socket.
///
/// _since Linux 3.16_
AuditRead,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_AUDIT_WRITE")]
/// Write records to kernel auditing log.
///
/// _since Linux 2.6.11_
AuditWrite,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND")]
/// Employ features that can block system suspend
/// ([epoll(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/epoll.7.html)
/// **EPOLLWAKEUP**, `/proc/sys/wake_lock`).
///
/// _since Linux 3.5_
BlockSuspend,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_BPF")]
/// Employ privileged BPF operations; see
/// [bpf(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/bpf.2.html) and
/// [bpf-helpers(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/bpf-helpers.7.html).
///
/// This capability was added to separate out BPF functionality from the
/// overloaded **CAP_SYS_ADMIN** capability.
///
/// _since Linux 5.8_
Bpf,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE")]
/// - update `/proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid` (see
/// [pid_namespaces(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/pid_namespaces.7.html))
/// - employ the set_tid feature of
/// [clone3(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/clone3.2.html)
/// - read the contents of the symbolic links in `/proc/[pid]/map_files` for
/// other processes.
///
/// This capability was added to separate out BPF functionality from the
/// overloaded **CAP_SYS_ADMIN** capability.
///
/// _since Linux 5.9_
CheckpointRestore,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_CHOWN")]
/// Make arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs (see
/// [chown(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/chown.2.html)).
Chown,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE")]
/// Bypass file read, write, and execute permission checks.
///
/// (DAC is an abbreviation of "discretionary access control".)
DacOverride,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH")]
/// - bypass file read permission checks and directory read and execute
/// permission checks
/// - invoke
/// [open_by_handle_at(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open_by_handle_at.2.html)
/// - use the
/// [linkat(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/linkat.2.html)
/// **AT_EMPTY_PATH** flag to create a link to a file referred to by a
/// file descriptor.
DacReadSearch,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_FOWNER")]
/// - Bypass permission checks on operations that normally require the
/// filesystem UID of the process to match the UID of the file (e.g.,
/// [chmod(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/chmod.2.html),
/// [utime(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/utime.2.html)),
/// excluding those operations covered by **CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE** and
/// **CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH**
/// - set inode flags (see
/// [ioctl_iflags(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl_iflags.2.html))
/// on arbitrary files
/// - set Access Control Lists (ACLs) on arbitrary files
/// - ignore directory sticky bit on file deletion
/// - modify user extended attributes on sticky directory owned by any user
/// - specify **O_NOATIME** for arbitrary files in
/// [open(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html) and
/// [fcntl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/fcntl.2.html)
///
/// Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
/// file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where CAP_FSETID
/// is applicable. It doesn't override MAC and DAC restrictions.
Fowner,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_FSETID")]
/// - don't clear set-user-ID and set-group-ID mode bits when a file is
/// modified
/// - set the set-group-ID bit for a file whose GID does not match the
/// filesystem or any of the supplementary GIDs of the calling process
Fsetid,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_IPC_LOCK")]
/// - lock memory
/// ([mlock(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mlock.2.html),
/// [mlockall(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mlockall.2.html),
/// [mmap(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mmap.2.html),
/// [shmctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/shmctl.2.html))
/// - allocate memory using huge pages
/// ([memfd_create(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/memfd_create.2.html)
/// [mmap(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mmap.2.html),
/// [shmctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/shmctl.2.html))
IpcLock,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_IPC_OWNER")]
/// Bypass permission checks for operations on System V IPC objects.
IpcOwner,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_KILL")]
/// Bypass permission checks for sending signals (see
/// [kill(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/kill.2.html)). This
/// includes use of the
/// [ioctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl.2.html)
/// **KDSIGACCEPT** operation.
Kill,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_LEASE")]
/// Establish leases on arbitrary files (see
/// [fcntl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/fcntl.2.html)).
///
/// _since Linux 2.4_
Lease,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE")]
/// Set the **FS_APPEND_FL** and **FS_IMMUTABLE_FL** inode flags (see
/// [ioctl_iflags(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl_iflags.2.html)).
LinuxImmutable,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_MAC_ADMIN")]
/// Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
///
/// Implemented for the Smack Linux Security Module (LSM).
///
/// _since Linux 2.6.25_
MacAdmin,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE")]
/// Override Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
///
/// Implemented for the Smack Linux Security Module (LSM).
///
/// _since Linux 2.6.25_
MacOverride,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_MKNOD")]
/// Create special files using
/// [mknod(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mknod.2.html).
///
/// _since Linux 2.4_
Mknod,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_NET_ADMIN")]
/// Perform various network-related operations:
/// - interface configuration
/// - administration of IP firewall, masquerading, and accounting
/// - modify routing tables
/// - bind to any address for transparent proxying
/// - set type-of-service (TOS)
/// - clear driver statistics
/// - set promiscuous mode
/// - enabling multicasting
/// - use
/// [setsockopt(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setsockopt.2.html)
/// to set the following socket options: **SO_DEBUG**, **SO_MARK**,
/// **SO_PRIORITY** (for a priority outside the range 0 to 6),
/// **SO_RCVBUFFORCE** and **SO_SNDBUFFORCE**
NetAdmin,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE")]
/// Bind a socket to Internet domain privileged ports (port numbers less
/// than 1024).
NetBindService,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_NET_BROADCAST")]
/// (Unused) Make socket broadcasts, and listen to multicasts.
NetBroadcast,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_NET_RAW")]
/// - use RAW and PACKET sockets
/// - bind to any address for transparent proxying
NetRaw,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_PERFMON")]
/// Employ various performance-monitoring mechanisms, including:
/// - call
/// [perf_event_open(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html)
/// - employ various BPF operations that have performance implications
///
/// This capability was added to separate out performance monitoring
/// functionality from the overloaded **CAP_SYS_ADMIN** capability. See also
/// the kernel source file `Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst`.
///
/// _since Linux 5.8_
Perfmon,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SETGID")]
/// - make arbitrary manipulations of process GIDs and supplementary GID list
/// - forge GID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets
/// - write a group ID mapping in a user namespace (see
/// [user_namespaces(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/user_namespaces.7.html))
Setgid,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SETFCAP")]
/// Set arbitrary capabilities on a file.
///
/// _since Linux 2.6.24_
Setfcap,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SETPCAP")]
/// If file capabilities are supported (i.e., since LinuxIDMapping 2.6.24):
/// add any capability from the calling thread's bounding set to its
/// inheritable set; drop capabilities from the bounding set (via
/// [prctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html)
/// **PR_CAPBSET_DROP**); make changes to the `securebits` flags.
///
/// If file capabilities are not supported (i.e., kernels before Linux
/// 2.6.24): grant or remove any capability in the caller's permitted
/// capability set to or from any other process. (This property of
/// **CAP_SETPCAP** is not available when the kernel is configured to
/// support file capabilities, since **CAP_SETPCAP** has entirely different
/// semantics for such kernels.)
Setpcap,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SETUID")]
/// - make arbitrary manipulations of process UIDs
/// ([setuid(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html),
/// [setreuid(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setreuid.2.html),
/// [setresuid(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setresuid.2.html),
/// [setfsuid(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setfsuid.2.html))
/// - forge UID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets
/// - write a user ID mapping in a user namespace (see
/// [user_namespaces(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/user_namespaces.7.html))
Setuid,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_ADMIN")]
/// - perform a range of system administration operations including:
/// [quotactl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/quotactl.2.html),
/// [mount(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mount.2.html),
/// [umount(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/umount.2.html),
/// [pivot_root(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/pivot_root.2.html),
/// [swapon(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/swapon.2.html),
/// [swapoff(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/swapoff.2.html),
/// [sethostname(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/sethostname.2.html),
/// and [setdomainname(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setdomainname.2.html)
/// - perform privileged
/// [syslog(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/syslog.2.html)
/// operations (since Linux 2.6.37, **CAP_SYSLOG** should be used to
/// permit such operations)
/// - perform **VM86_REQUEST_IRQ vm86**(2) command
/// - access the same checkpoint/restore functionality that is governed by
/// **CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE** (but the latter, weaker capability is
/// preferred for accessing that functionality)
/// - perform the same BPF operations as are governed by **CAP_BPF** (but
/// the latter, weaker capability is preferred for accessing that
/// functionality).
/// - employ the same performance monitoring mechanisms as are governed by
/// **CAP_PERFMON** (but the latter, weaker capability is preferred for
/// accessing that functionality).
/// - perform **IPC_SET** and **IPC_RMID** operations on arbitrary System V
/// IPC objects
/// - override **RLIMIT_NPROC** resource limit
/// - perform operations on `trusted` and `security` extended attributes
/// (see [xattr(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/xattr.7.html))
/// - use
/// [lookup_dcookie(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/lookup_dcookie.2.html)
/// - use
/// [ioprio_set(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioprio_set.2.html)
/// to assign **IOPRIO_CLASS_RT** and (before Linux 2.6.25)
/// **IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE** I/O scheduling classes
/// - forge PID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets
/// - exceed `/proc/sys/fs/file-max`, the system-wide limit on the number of
/// open files, in system calls that open files (e.g.,
/// [accept(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/accept.2.html),
/// [execve(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/execve.2.html),
/// [open(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html),
/// [pipe(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/pipe.2.html))
/// - employ **CLONE_*** flags that create new namespaces with
/// [clone(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/clone.2.html) and
/// [unshare(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/unshare.2.html)
/// (but, since Linux 3.8, creating user namespaces does not require any
/// capability)
/// - access privileged `perf` event information
/// - call [setns(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setns.2.html)
/// (requires **CAP_SYS_ADMIN** in the `target` namespace)
/// - call
/// [fanotify_init(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/fanotify_init.2.html)
/// - perform privileged **KEYCTL_CHOWN** and **KEYCTL_SETPERM**
/// [keyctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/keyctl.2.html)
/// operations
/// - perform
/// [madvise(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/madvise.2.html)
/// **MADV_HWPOISON** operation
/// - employ the **TIOCSTI ioctl**(2) to insert characters into the input
/// queue of a terminal other than the caller's controlling terminal
/// - employ the obsolete
/// [nfsservctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/nfsservctl.2.html)
/// system call
/// - employ the obsolete
/// [bdflush(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/bdflush.2.html)
/// system call
/// - perform various privileged block-device
/// [ioctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl.2.html)
/// operations
/// - perform various privileged filesystem
/// [ioctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl.2.html)
/// operations
/// - perform privileged
/// [ioctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl.2.html)
/// operations on the `/dev/random` device (see
/// [random(4)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man4/random.4.html))
/// - install a
/// [seccomp(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/seccomp.2.html)
/// filter without first having to set the `no_new_privs` thread attribute
/// - modify allow/deny rules for device control groups
/// - employ the
/// [ptrace(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html)
/// **PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER** operation to dump tracee's seccomp
/// filters
/// - employ the
/// [ptrace(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html)
/// **PTRACE_SETOPTIONS** operation to suspend the tracee's seccomp
/// protections (i.e., the **PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP** flag)
/// - perform administrative operations on many device drivers
/// - modify autogroup nice values by writing to `/proc/[pid]/autogroup`
/// (see [sched(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/sched.7.html))
SysAdmin,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_BOOT")]
/// Use [reboot(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/reboot.2.html) and
/// [kexec_load(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/kexec_load.2.html).
SysBoot,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_CHROOT")]
/// - use [chroot(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/chroot.2.html)
/// - change mount namespaces using
/// [setns(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setns.2.html)
SysChroot,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_MODULE")]
/// - load and unload kernel modules (see
/// [init_module(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/init_module.2.html)
/// and
/// [delete_module(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/delete_module.2.html))
/// - in kernels before 2.6.25: drop capabilities from the system-wide
/// capability bounding set
SysModule,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_NICE")]
/// - lower the process nice value
/// ([nice(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/nice.2.html),
/// [setpriority(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setpriority.2.html))
/// and change the nice value for arbitrary processes
/// - set real-time scheduling policies for calling process, and set
/// scheduling policies and priorities for arbitrary processes
/// ([sched_setscheduler(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/sched_setscheduler.2.html),
/// [sched_setparam(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/sched_setparam.2.html),
/// [sched_setattr(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/sched_setattr.2.html))
/// - set CPU affinity for arbitrary processes
/// ([sched_setaffinity(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/sched_setaffinity.2.html))
/// - set I/O scheduling class and priority for arbitrary processes
/// ([ioprio_set(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioprio_set.2.html))
/// - apply
/// [migrate_pages(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/migrate_pages.2.html)
/// to arbitrary processes and allow processes to be migrated to arbitrary
/// nodes
/// - apply
/// [move_pages(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/move_pages.2.html)
/// to arbitrary processes
/// - use the **MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL** flag with
/// [mbind(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mbind.2.html) and
/// [move_pages(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/move_pages.2.html)
SysNice,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_PACCT")]
/// Use [acct(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/acct.2.html).
SysPacct,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_PTRACE")]
/// - trace arbitrary processes using
/// [ptrace(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ptrace.2.html)
/// - apply
/// [get_robust_list(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/get_robust_list.2.html)
/// to arbitrary processes
/// - transfer data to or from the memory of arbitrary processes using
/// [process_vm_readv(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/process_vm_readv.2.html)
/// and
/// [process_vm_writev(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/process_vm_writev.2.html)
/// - inspect processes using
/// [kcmp(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/kcmp.2.html)
SysPtrace,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_RAWIO")]
/// - perform I/O port operations
/// ([iopl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/iopl.2.html) and
/// [ioperm(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioperm.2.html));
/// - access `/proc/kcore`
/// - employ the **FIBMAP ioctl**(2) operation
/// - open devices for accessing x86 model-specific registers (MSRs, see
/// [msr(4)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man4/msr.4.html))
/// - update `/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr`
/// - create memory mappings at addresses below the value specified by
/// `/proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr`
/// - map files in `/proc/bus/pci`
/// - open `/dev/mem` and `/dev/kmem`
/// - perform various SCSI device commands
/// - perform certain operations on
/// [hpsa(4)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man4/hpsa.4.html) and
/// [cciss(4)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man4/cciss.4.html) devices
/// - perform a range of device-specific operations on other devices
SysRawio,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_RESOURCE")]
/// - use reserved space on ext2 filesystems
/// - make [ioctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl.2.html)
/// calls controlling ext3 journaling
/// - override disk quota limits
/// - increase resource limits (see
/// [setrlimit(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setrlimit.2.html))
/// - override **RLIMIT_NPROC** resource limit
/// - override maximum number of consoles on console allocation
/// - override maximum number of keymaps
/// - allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock
/// - raise `msg_qbytes` limit for a System V message queue above the limit
/// in `/proc/sys/kernel/msgmnb` (see
/// [msgop(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/msgop.2.html) and
/// [msgctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/msgctl.2.html))
/// - allow the **RLIMIT_NOFILE** resource limit on the number of
/// "in-flight" file descriptors to be bypassed when passing file
/// descriptors to another process via a UNIX domain socket (see
/// [unix(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/unix.7.html));
/// - override the `/proc/sys/fs/pipe-size-max` limit when setting the
/// capacity of a pipe using the **F_SETPIPE_SZ**
/// [fcntl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/fcntl.2.html) command
/// - use **F_SETPIPE_SZ** to increase the capacity of a pipe above the
/// limit specified by `/proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size`
/// - override `/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/queues_max`,
/// `/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg_max` and `/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msgsize_max`
/// limits when creating POSIX message queues (see
/// [mq_overview(7)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/mq_overview.7.html))
/// - employ the
/// [prctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html)
/// **PR_SET_MM** operation
/// - set `/proc/[pid]/oom_score_adj` to a value lower than the value last
/// set by a process with **CAP_SYS_RESOURCE**
SysResource,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_TIME")]
/// - set system clock
/// ([settimeofday(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/settimeofday.2.html),
/// [stime(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/stime.2.html),
/// [adjtimex(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/adjtimex.2.html))
/// - set real-time (hardware) clock
SysTime,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG")]
/// - use
/// [vhangup(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/vhangup.2.html)
/// - employ various privileged
/// [ioctl(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/ioctl.2.html)
/// operations on virtual terminals
SysTtyConfig,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_SYSLOG")]
/// - perform privileged
/// [syslog(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/syslog.2.html)
/// operations. See
/// [syslog(2)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/syslog.2.html) for
/// information on which operations require privilege.
/// - view kernel addresses exposed via `/proc` and other interfaces when
/// `/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict` has the value 1. (See the discussion
/// of the `kptr_restrict` in
/// [proc(5)](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/proc.5.html).)
///
/// _since Linux 2.6.37_
Syslog,
#[serde(rename = "CAP_WAKE_ALARM")]
/// Trigger something that will wake up the system (set
/// **CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM** and **CLOCK_BOOTTIME_ALARM** timers).
/// _since Linux 3.0_
WakeAlarm,
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for Capability {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
let input = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
let upper = input.to_uppercase();
let stripped = upper.strip_prefix("CAP_").unwrap_or(&upper);
match stripped {
"AUDIT_CONTROL" => Ok(Self::AuditControl),
"AUDIT_READ" => Ok(Self::AuditRead),
"AUDIT_WRITE" => Ok(Self::AuditWrite),
"BLOCK_SUSPEND" => Ok(Self::BlockSuspend),
"BPF" => Ok(Self::Bpf),
"CHECKPOINT_RESTORE" => Ok(Self::CheckpointRestore),
"CHOWN" => Ok(Self::Chown),
"DAC_OVERRIDE" => Ok(Self::DacOverride),
"DAC_READ_SEARCH" => Ok(Self::DacReadSearch),
"FOWNER" => Ok(Self::Fowner),
"FSETID" => Ok(Self::Fsetid),
"IPC_LOCK" => Ok(Self::IpcLock),
"IPC_OWNER" => Ok(Self::IpcOwner),
"KILL" => Ok(Self::Kill),
"LEASE" => Ok(Self::Lease),
"LINUX_IMMUTABLE" => Ok(Self::LinuxImmutable),
"MAC_ADMIN" => Ok(Self::MacAdmin),
"MAC_OVERRIDE" => Ok(Self::MacOverride),
"MKNOD" => Ok(Self::Mknod),
"NET_ADMIN" => Ok(Self::NetAdmin),
"NET_BIND_SERVICE" => Ok(Self::NetBindService),
"NET_BROADCAST" => Ok(Self::NetBroadcast),
"NET_RAW" => Ok(Self::NetRaw),
"PERFMON" => Ok(Self::Perfmon),
"SETGID" => Ok(Self::Setgid),
"SETFCAP" => Ok(Self::Setfcap),
"SETPCAP" => Ok(Self::Setpcap),
"SETUID" => Ok(Self::Setuid),
"SYS_ADMIN" => Ok(Self::SysAdmin),
"SYS_BOOT" => Ok(Self::SysBoot),
"SYS_CHROOT" => Ok(Self::SysChroot),
"SYS_MODULE" => Ok(Self::SysModule),
"SYS_NICE" => Ok(Self::SysNice),
"SYS_PACCT" => Ok(Self::SysPacct),
"SYS_PTRACE" => Ok(Self::SysPtrace),
"SYS_RAWIO" => Ok(Self::SysRawio),
"SYS_RESOURCE" => Ok(Self::SysResource),
"SYS_TIME" => Ok(Self::SysTime),
"SYS_TTY_CONFIG" => Ok(Self::SysTtyConfig),
"SYSLOG" => Ok(Self::Syslog),
"WAKE_ALARM" => Ok(Self::WakeAlarm),
other => Err(Error::custom(format!(
"no variant for {input} (converted to {other})",
))),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::error::Result;
#[test]
fn serialize() {
let chown = Capability::Chown;
let res = serde_json::to_string(&chown).expect("unable to serialize");
assert_eq!("\"CAP_CHOWN\"", res);
}
#[test]
fn deserialize() -> Result<()> {
for case in &["SYSLOG", "CAP_SYSLOG", "cap_SYSLOG", "sySloG"] {
let res: Capability = serde_json::from_str(&format!("\"{case}\""))?;
assert_eq!(Capability::Syslog, res);
}
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn capabilities() -> Result<()> {
let res: Capabilities = serde_json::from_str(
r#"[
"syslog",
"SYSLOG",
"chown",
"cap_chown"
]"#,
)?;
assert_eq!(res.len(), 2);
assert!(res.contains(&Capability::Syslog));
assert!(res.contains(&Capability::Chown));
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn invalid_string2enum() {
let invalid_cap_str = "INVALID_CAP";
let unknown_cap = invalid_cap_str.parse::<Capability>();
assert!(unknown_cap.is_err());
}
#[test]
fn cap_enum_to_string() {
let cap = Capability::AuditControl;
assert_eq!(cap.to_string(), "AUDIT_CONTROL");
let cap = Capability::AuditRead;
assert_eq!(cap.to_string(), "AUDIT_READ");
let cap = Capability::SysAdmin;
assert_eq!(cap.to_string(), "SYS_ADMIN");
}
#[test]
fn cap_string_to_enum() {
let cap_str = "AUDIT_CONTROL";
let cap_enum: Capability = cap_str.parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(cap_enum, Capability::AuditControl);
let cap_str = "AUDIT_READ";
let cap_enum: Capability = cap_str.parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(cap_enum, Capability::AuditRead);
let cap_str = "SYS_ADMIN";
let cap_enum: Capability = cap_str.parse().unwrap();
assert_eq!(cap_enum, Capability::SysAdmin);
}
#[test]
fn test_serde_serialization() {
let cap = Capability::AuditControl;
let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&cap).unwrap();
assert_eq!(serialized, "\"CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL\"");
let cap = Capability::SysAdmin;
let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&cap).unwrap();
assert_eq!(serialized, "\"CAP_SYS_ADMIN\"");
}
#[test]
fn test_serde_deserialization() {
let serialized = "\"CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL\"";
let cap: Capability = serde_json::from_str(serialized).unwrap();
assert_eq!(cap, Capability::AuditControl);
let serialized = "\"CAP_SYS_ADMIN\"";
let cap: Capability = serde_json::from_str(serialized).unwrap();
assert_eq!(cap, Capability::SysAdmin);
}
}