solana_zk_token_sdk/instruction/batched_grouped_ciphertext_validity/
handles_2.rs

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
//! The batched grouped-ciphertext validity proof instruction.
//!
//! A batched grouped-ciphertext validity proof certifies the validity of two grouped ElGamal
//! ciphertext that are encrypted using the same set of ElGamal public keys. A batched
//! grouped-ciphertext validity proof is shorter and more efficient than two individual
//! grouped-ciphertext validity proofs.
//!
//! Currently, the batched grouped-ciphertext validity proof is restricted to ciphertexts with two
//! handles. In accordance with the SPL Token program application, the first decryption handle
//! associated with the proof is referred to as the "destination" handle and the second decryption
//! handle is referred to as the "auditor" handle. Furthermore, the first grouped ciphertext is
//! referred to as the "lo" ciphertext and the second grouped ciphertext is referred to as the "hi"
//! ciphertext.

#[cfg(not(target_os = "solana"))]
use {
    crate::{
        encryption::{
            elgamal::ElGamalPubkey, grouped_elgamal::GroupedElGamalCiphertext,
            pedersen::PedersenOpening,
        },
        errors::{ProofGenerationError, ProofVerificationError},
        sigma_proofs::batched_grouped_ciphertext_validity_proof::BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProof,
        transcript::TranscriptProtocol,
    },
    merlin::Transcript,
};
use {
    crate::{
        instruction::{ProofType, ZkProofData},
        zk_token_elgamal::pod,
    },
    bytemuck_derive::{Pod, Zeroable},
};

/// The instruction data that is needed for the
/// `ProofInstruction::VerifyBatchedGroupedCiphertextValidity` instruction.
///
/// It includes the cryptographic proof as well as the context data information needed to verify
/// the proof.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Pod, Zeroable)]
#[repr(C)]
pub struct BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofData {
    pub context: BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofContext,

    pub proof: pod::BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProof,
}

#[derive(Clone, Copy, Pod, Zeroable)]
#[repr(C)]
pub struct BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofContext {
    pub destination_pubkey: pod::ElGamalPubkey, // 32 bytes

    pub auditor_pubkey: pod::ElGamalPubkey, // 32 bytes

    pub grouped_ciphertext_lo: pod::GroupedElGamalCiphertext2Handles, // 96 bytes

    pub grouped_ciphertext_hi: pod::GroupedElGamalCiphertext2Handles, // 96 bytes
}

#[cfg(not(target_os = "solana"))]
impl BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofData {
    pub fn new(
        destination_pubkey: &ElGamalPubkey,
        auditor_pubkey: &ElGamalPubkey,
        grouped_ciphertext_lo: &GroupedElGamalCiphertext<2>,
        grouped_ciphertext_hi: &GroupedElGamalCiphertext<2>,
        amount_lo: u64,
        amount_hi: u64,
        opening_lo: &PedersenOpening,
        opening_hi: &PedersenOpening,
    ) -> Result<Self, ProofGenerationError> {
        let pod_destination_pubkey = pod::ElGamalPubkey(destination_pubkey.into());
        let pod_auditor_pubkey = pod::ElGamalPubkey(auditor_pubkey.into());
        let pod_grouped_ciphertext_lo = (*grouped_ciphertext_lo).into();
        let pod_grouped_ciphertext_hi = (*grouped_ciphertext_hi).into();

        let context = BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofContext {
            destination_pubkey: pod_destination_pubkey,
            auditor_pubkey: pod_auditor_pubkey,
            grouped_ciphertext_lo: pod_grouped_ciphertext_lo,
            grouped_ciphertext_hi: pod_grouped_ciphertext_hi,
        };

        let mut transcript = context.new_transcript();

        let proof = BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProof::new(
            (destination_pubkey, auditor_pubkey),
            (amount_lo, amount_hi),
            (opening_lo, opening_hi),
            &mut transcript,
        )
        .into();

        Ok(Self { context, proof })
    }
}

impl ZkProofData<BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofContext>
    for BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofData
{
    const PROOF_TYPE: ProofType = ProofType::BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidity;

    fn context_data(&self) -> &BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofContext {
        &self.context
    }

    #[cfg(not(target_os = "solana"))]
    fn verify_proof(&self) -> Result<(), ProofVerificationError> {
        let mut transcript = self.context.new_transcript();

        let destination_pubkey = self.context.destination_pubkey.try_into()?;
        let auditor_pubkey = self.context.auditor_pubkey.try_into()?;
        let grouped_ciphertext_lo: GroupedElGamalCiphertext<2> =
            self.context.grouped_ciphertext_lo.try_into()?;
        let grouped_ciphertext_hi: GroupedElGamalCiphertext<2> =
            self.context.grouped_ciphertext_hi.try_into()?;

        let destination_handle_lo = grouped_ciphertext_lo.handles.first().unwrap();
        let auditor_handle_lo = grouped_ciphertext_lo.handles.get(1).unwrap();

        let destination_handle_hi = grouped_ciphertext_hi.handles.first().unwrap();
        let auditor_handle_hi = grouped_ciphertext_hi.handles.get(1).unwrap();

        let proof: BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProof = self.proof.try_into()?;

        proof
            .verify(
                (&destination_pubkey, &auditor_pubkey),
                (
                    &grouped_ciphertext_lo.commitment,
                    &grouped_ciphertext_hi.commitment,
                ),
                (destination_handle_lo, destination_handle_hi),
                (auditor_handle_lo, auditor_handle_hi),
                &mut transcript,
            )
            .map_err(|e| e.into())
    }
}

#[cfg(not(target_os = "solana"))]
impl BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofContext {
    fn new_transcript(&self) -> Transcript {
        let mut transcript = Transcript::new(b"BatchedGroupedCiphertextValidityProof");

        transcript.append_pubkey(b"destination-pubkey", &self.destination_pubkey);
        transcript.append_pubkey(b"auditor-pubkey", &self.auditor_pubkey);
        transcript.append_grouped_ciphertext_2_handles(
            b"grouped-ciphertext-lo",
            &self.grouped_ciphertext_lo,
        );
        transcript.append_grouped_ciphertext_2_handles(
            b"grouped-ciphertext-hi",
            &self.grouped_ciphertext_hi,
        );

        transcript
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod test {
    use {
        super::*,
        crate::encryption::{elgamal::ElGamalKeypair, grouped_elgamal::GroupedElGamal},
    };

    #[test]
    fn test_ciphertext_validity_proof_instruction_correctness() {
        let destination_keypair = ElGamalKeypair::new_rand();
        let destination_pubkey = destination_keypair.pubkey();

        let auditor_keypair = ElGamalKeypair::new_rand();
        let auditor_pubkey = auditor_keypair.pubkey();

        let amount_lo: u64 = 11;
        let amount_hi: u64 = 22;

        let opening_lo = PedersenOpening::new_rand();
        let opening_hi = PedersenOpening::new_rand();

        let grouped_ciphertext_lo = GroupedElGamal::encrypt_with(
            [destination_pubkey, auditor_pubkey],
            amount_lo,
            &opening_lo,
        );

        let grouped_ciphertext_hi = GroupedElGamal::encrypt_with(
            [destination_pubkey, auditor_pubkey],
            amount_hi,
            &opening_hi,
        );

        let proof_data = BatchedGroupedCiphertext2HandlesValidityProofData::new(
            destination_pubkey,
            auditor_pubkey,
            &grouped_ciphertext_lo,
            &grouped_ciphertext_hi,
            amount_lo,
            amount_hi,
            &opening_lo,
            &opening_hi,
        )
        .unwrap();

        assert!(proof_data.verify_proof().is_ok());
    }
}