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// Copyright 2015-2023 Benjamin Fry <benjaminfry@me.com>
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0, <LICENSE-APACHE or
// http://apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license <LICENSE-MIT or
// http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option. This file may not be
// copied, modified, or distributed except according to those terms.
//! public key record data for signing zone records
use std::fmt;
#[cfg(feature = "serde-config")]
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use crate::{
error::{ProtoError, ProtoErrorKind, ProtoResult},
rr::{
dnssec::{Algorithm, Digest, DigestType},
record_data::RData,
Name, RecordData, RecordDataDecodable, RecordType,
},
serialize::binary::{
BinDecodable, BinDecoder, BinEncodable, BinEncoder, Restrict, RestrictedMath,
},
};
use super::DNSSECRData;
/// [RFC 4034](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034#section-2), DNSSEC Resource Records, March 2005
///
/// ```text
/// 2. The DNSKEY Resource Record
///
/// DNSSEC uses public key cryptography to sign and authenticate DNS
/// resource record sets (RRsets). The public keys are stored in DNSKEY
/// resource records and are used in the DNSSEC authentication process
/// described in [RFC4035]: A zone signs its authoritative RRsets by
/// using a private key and stores the corresponding public key in a
/// DNSKEY RR. A resolver can then use the public key to validate
/// signatures covering the RRsets in the zone, and thus to authenticate
/// them.
///
/// The DNSKEY RR is not intended as a record for storing arbitrary
/// public keys and MUST NOT be used to store certificates or public keys
/// that do not directly relate to the DNS infrastructure.
///
/// The Type value for the DNSKEY RR type is 48.
///
/// The DNSKEY RR is class independent.
///
/// The DNSKEY RR has no special TTL requirements.
///
/// 2.1. DNSKEY RDATA Wire Format
///
/// The RDATA for a DNSKEY RR consists of a 2 octet Flags Field, a 1
/// octet Protocol Field, a 1 octet Algorithm Field, and the Public Key
/// Field.
///
/// 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
/// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
/// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/// | Flags | Protocol | Algorithm |
/// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/// / /
/// / Public Key /
/// / /
/// +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
///
/// 2.1.5. Notes on DNSKEY RDATA Design
///
/// Although the Protocol Field always has value 3, it is retained for
/// backward compatibility with early versions of the KEY record.
///
/// ```
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde-config", derive(Deserialize, Serialize))]
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Clone)]
pub struct DNSKEY {
zone_key: bool,
secure_entry_point: bool,
revoke: bool,
algorithm: Algorithm,
public_key: Vec<u8>,
}
impl DNSKEY {
/// Construct a new DNSKey RData
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `zone_key` - this key is used to sign Zone resource records
/// * `secure_entry_point` - this key is used to sign DNSKeys that sign the Zone records
/// * `revoke` - this key has been revoked
/// * `algorithm` - specifies the algorithm which this Key uses to sign records
/// * `public_key` - the public key material, in native endian, the emitter will perform any necessary conversion
///
/// # Return
///
/// A new DNSKEY RData for use in a Resource Record
pub fn new(
zone_key: bool,
secure_entry_point: bool,
revoke: bool,
algorithm: Algorithm,
public_key: Vec<u8>,
) -> Self {
Self {
zone_key,
secure_entry_point,
revoke,
algorithm,
public_key,
}
}
/// [RFC 4034, DNSSEC Resource Records, March 2005](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034#section-2.1.1)
///
/// ```text
/// 2.1.1. The Flags Field
///
/// Bit 7 of the Flags field is the Zone Key flag. If bit 7 has value 1,
/// then the DNSKEY record holds a DNS zone key, and the DNSKEY RR's
/// owner name MUST be the name of a zone. If bit 7 has value 0, then
/// the DNSKEY record holds some other type of DNS public key and MUST
/// NOT be used to verify RRSIGs that cover RRsets.
///
///
/// Bits 0-6 and 8-14 are reserved: these bits MUST have value 0 upon
/// creation of the DNSKEY RR and MUST be ignored upon receipt.
/// ```
pub fn zone_key(&self) -> bool {
self.zone_key
}
/// [RFC 4034, DNSSEC Resource Records, March 2005](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034#section-2.1.1)
///
/// ```text
/// 2.1.1. The Flags Field
///
/// Bit 15 of the Flags field is the Secure Entry Point flag, described
/// in [RFC3757]. If bit 15 has value 1, then the DNSKEY record holds a
/// key intended for use as a secure entry point. This flag is only
/// intended to be a hint to zone signing or debugging software as to the
/// intended use of this DNSKEY record; validators MUST NOT alter their
/// behavior during the signature validation process in any way based on
/// the setting of this bit. This also means that a DNSKEY RR with the
/// SEP bit set would also need the Zone Key flag set in order to be able
/// to generate signatures legally. A DNSKEY RR with the SEP set and the
/// Zone Key flag not set MUST NOT be used to verify RRSIGs that cover
/// RRsets.
/// ```
pub fn secure_entry_point(&self) -> bool {
self.secure_entry_point
}
/// [RFC 5011, Trust Anchor Update, September 2007](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5011#section-3)
///
/// ```text
/// RFC 5011 Trust Anchor Update September 2007
///
/// 7. IANA Considerations
///
/// The IANA has assigned a bit in the DNSKEY flags field (see Section 7
/// of [RFC4034]) for the REVOKE bit (8).
/// ```
pub fn revoke(&self) -> bool {
self.revoke
}
/// [RFC 4034, DNSSEC Resource Records, March 2005](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034#section-2.1.3)
///
/// ```text
/// 2.1.3. The Algorithm Field
///
/// The Algorithm field identifies the public key's cryptographic
/// algorithm and determines the format of the Public Key field. A list
/// of DNSSEC algorithm types can be found in Appendix A.1
/// ```
pub fn algorithm(&self) -> Algorithm {
self.algorithm
}
/// [RFC 4034, DNSSEC Resource Records, March 2005](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034#section-2.1.4)
///
/// ```text
/// 2.1.4. The Public Key Field
///
/// The Public Key Field holds the public key material. The format
/// depends on the algorithm of the key being stored and is described in
/// separate documents.
/// ```
pub fn public_key(&self) -> &[u8] {
&self.public_key
}
/// Output the encoded form of the flags
pub fn flags(&self) -> u16 {
let mut flags: u16 = 0;
if self.zone_key() {
flags |= 0b0000_0001_0000_0000
}
if self.secure_entry_point() {
flags |= 0b0000_0000_0000_0001
}
if self.revoke() {
flags |= 0b0000_0000_1000_0000
}
flags
}
/// Creates a message digest for this DNSKEY record.
///
/// ```text
/// 5.1.4. The Digest Field
///
/// The DS record refers to a DNSKEY RR by including a digest of that
/// DNSKEY RR.
///
/// The digest is calculated by concatenating the canonical form of the
/// fully qualified owner name of the DNSKEY RR with the DNSKEY RDATA,
/// and then applying the digest algorithm.
///
/// digest = digest_algorithm( DNSKEY owner name | DNSKEY RDATA);
///
/// "|" denotes concatenation
///
/// DNSKEY RDATA = Flags | Protocol | Algorithm | Public Key.
///
/// The size of the digest may vary depending on the digest algorithm and
/// DNSKEY RR size. As of the time of this writing, the only defined
/// digest algorithm is SHA-1, which produces a 20 octet digest.
/// ```
///
/// # Arguments
///
/// * `name` - the label of of the DNSKEY record.
/// * `digest_type` - the `DigestType` with which to create the message digest.
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))))]
pub fn to_digest(&self, name: &Name, digest_type: DigestType) -> ProtoResult<Digest> {
let mut buf: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
{
let mut encoder: BinEncoder<'_> = BinEncoder::new(&mut buf);
encoder.set_canonical_names(true);
if let Err(e) = name
.emit(&mut encoder)
.and_then(|_| self.emit(&mut encoder))
{
tracing::warn!("error serializing dnskey: {e}");
return Err(format!("error serializing dnskey: {e}").into());
}
}
digest_type.hash(&buf)
}
/// This will always return an error unless the Ring or OpenSSL features are enabled
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring")))]
#[cfg_attr(docsrs, doc(cfg(not(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring")))))]
pub fn to_digest(&self, _: &Name, _: DigestType) -> ProtoResult<Digest> {
Err("Ring or OpenSSL must be enabled for this feature".into())
}
/// The key tag is calculated as a hash to more quickly lookup a DNSKEY.
///
/// [RFC 2535](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2535), Domain Name System Security Extensions, March 1999
///
/// ```text
/// RFC 2535 DNS Security Extensions March 1999
///
/// 4.1.6 Key Tag Field
///
/// The "key Tag" is a two octet quantity that is used to efficiently
/// select between multiple keys which may be applicable and thus check
/// that a public key about to be used for the computationally expensive
/// effort to check the signature is possibly valid. For algorithm 1
/// (MD5/RSA) as defined in [RFC 2537], it is the next to the bottom two
/// octets of the public key modulus needed to decode the signature
/// field. That is to say, the most significant 16 of the least
/// significant 24 bits of the modulus in network (big endian) order. For
/// all other algorithms, including private algorithms, it is calculated
/// as a simple checksum of the KEY RR as described in Appendix C.
///
/// Appendix C: Key Tag Calculation
///
/// The key tag field in the SIG RR is just a means of more efficiently
/// selecting the correct KEY RR to use when there is more than one KEY
/// RR candidate available, for example, in verifying a signature. It is
/// possible for more than one candidate key to have the same tag, in
/// which case each must be tried until one works or all fail. The
/// following reference implementation of how to calculate the Key Tag,
/// for all algorithms other than algorithm 1, is in ANSI C. It is coded
/// for clarity, not efficiency. (See section 4.1.6 for how to determine
/// the Key Tag of an algorithm 1 key.)
///
/// /* assumes int is at least 16 bits
/// first byte of the key tag is the most significant byte of return
/// value
/// second byte of the key tag is the least significant byte of
/// return value
/// */
///
/// int keytag (
///
/// unsigned char key[], /* the RDATA part of the KEY RR */
/// unsigned int keysize, /* the RDLENGTH */
/// )
/// {
/// long int ac; /* assumed to be 32 bits or larger */
///
/// for ( ac = 0, i = 0; i < keysize; ++i )
/// ac += (i&1) ? key[i] : key[i]<<8;
/// ac += (ac>>16) & 0xFFFF;
/// return ac & 0xFFFF;
/// }
/// ```
pub fn calculate_key_tag(&self) -> ProtoResult<u16> {
// TODO:
let mut bytes: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(512);
{
let mut e = BinEncoder::new(&mut bytes);
self.emit(&mut e)?;
}
Ok(Self::calculate_key_tag_internal(&bytes))
}
/// Internal checksum function (used for non-RSAMD5 hashes only,
/// however, RSAMD5 is considered deprecated and not implemented in
/// trust-dns, anyways).
pub fn calculate_key_tag_internal(bytes: &[u8]) -> u16 {
let mut ac: u32 = 0;
for (i, k) in bytes.iter().enumerate() {
ac += u32::from(*k) << if i & 0x01 != 0 { 0 } else { 8 };
}
ac += ac >> 16;
(ac & 0xFFFF) as u16
}
}
impl From<DNSKEY> for RData {
fn from(key: DNSKEY) -> Self {
Self::DNSSEC(super::DNSSECRData::DNSKEY(key))
}
}
impl BinEncodable for DNSKEY {
fn emit(&self, encoder: &mut BinEncoder<'_>) -> ProtoResult<()> {
encoder.emit_u16(self.flags())?;
encoder.emit(3)?; // always 3 for now
self.algorithm().emit(encoder)?;
encoder.emit_vec(self.public_key())?;
Ok(())
}
}
impl<'r> RecordDataDecodable<'r> for DNSKEY {
fn read_data(decoder: &mut BinDecoder<'r>, length: Restrict<u16>) -> ProtoResult<Self> {
let flags: u16 = decoder.read_u16()?.unverified(/*used as a bitfield, this is safe*/);
// Bits 0-6 and 8-14 are reserved: these bits MUST have value 0 upon
// creation of the DNSKEY RR and MUST be ignored upon receipt.
let zone_key: bool = flags & 0b0000_0001_0000_0000 == 0b0000_0001_0000_0000;
let secure_entry_point: bool = flags & 0b0000_0000_0000_0001 == 0b0000_0000_0000_0001;
let revoke: bool = flags & 0b0000_0000_1000_0000 == 0b0000_0000_1000_0000;
let _protocol: u8 = decoder
.read_u8()?
.verify_unwrap(|protocol| {
// RFC 4034 DNSSEC Resource Records March 2005
//
// 2.1.2. The Protocol Field
//
// The Protocol Field MUST have value 3, and the DNSKEY RR MUST be
// treated as invalid during signature verification if it is found to be
// some value other than 3.
//
// protocol is defined to only be '3' right now
*protocol == 3
})
.map_err(|protocol| ProtoError::from(ProtoErrorKind::DnsKeyProtocolNot3(protocol)))?;
let algorithm: Algorithm = Algorithm::read(decoder)?;
// the public key is the left-over bytes minus 4 for the first fields
// this sub is safe, as the first 4 fields must have been in the rdata, otherwise there would have been
// an earlier return.
let key_len = length
.map(|u| u as usize)
.checked_sub(4)
.map_err(|_| ProtoError::from("invalid rdata length in DNSKEY"))?
.unverified(/*used only as length safely*/);
let public_key: Vec<u8> =
decoder.read_vec(key_len)?.unverified(/*the byte array will fail in usage if invalid*/);
Ok(Self::new(
zone_key,
secure_entry_point,
revoke,
algorithm,
public_key,
))
}
}
impl RecordData for DNSKEY {
fn try_from_rdata(data: RData) -> Result<Self, RData> {
match data {
RData::DNSSEC(DNSSECRData::DNSKEY(csync)) => Ok(csync),
_ => Err(data),
}
}
fn try_borrow(data: &RData) -> Option<&Self> {
match data {
RData::DNSSEC(DNSSECRData::DNSKEY(csync)) => Some(csync),
_ => None,
}
}
fn record_type(&self) -> RecordType {
RecordType::DNSKEY
}
fn into_rdata(self) -> RData {
RData::DNSSEC(DNSSECRData::DNSKEY(self))
}
}
/// [RFC 4034, DNSSEC Resource Records, March 2005](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034#section-2.2)
///
/// ```text
/// 2.2. The DNSKEY RR Presentation Format
///
/// The presentation format of the RDATA portion is as follows:
///
/// The Flag field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal integer.
/// Given the currently defined flags, the possible values are: 0, 256,
/// and 257.
///
/// The Protocol Field MUST be represented as an unsigned decimal integer
/// with a value of 3.
///
/// The Algorithm field MUST be represented either as an unsigned decimal
/// integer or as an algorithm mnemonic as specified in Appendix A.1.
///
/// The Public Key field MUST be represented as a Base64 encoding of the
/// Public Key. Whitespace is allowed within the Base64 text. For a
/// definition of Base64 encoding, see [RFC3548].
///
/// 2.3. DNSKEY RR Example
///
/// The following DNSKEY RR stores a DNS zone key for example.com.
///
/// example.com. 86400 IN DNSKEY 256 3 5 ( AQPSKmynfzW4kyBv015MUG2DeIQ3
/// Cbl+BBZH4b/0PY1kxkmvHjcZc8no
/// kfzj31GajIQKY+5CptLr3buXA10h
/// WqTkF7H6RfoRqXQeogmMHfpftf6z
/// Mv1LyBUgia7za6ZEzOJBOztyvhjL
/// 742iU/TpPSEDhm2SNKLijfUppn1U
/// aNvv4w== )
///
/// The first four text fields specify the owner name, TTL, Class, and RR
/// type (DNSKEY). Value 256 indicates that the Zone Key bit (bit 7) in
/// the Flags field has value 1. Value 3 is the fixed Protocol value.
/// Value 5 indicates the public key algorithm. Appendix A.1 identifies
/// algorithm type 5 as RSA/SHA1 and indicates that the format of the
/// RSA/SHA1 public key field is defined in [RFC3110]. The remaining
/// text is a Base64 encoding of the public key.
/// ```
impl fmt::Display for DNSKEY {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> Result<(), fmt::Error> {
write!(
f,
"{flags} 3 {alg} {key}",
flags = self.flags(),
alg = u8::from(self.algorithm),
key = data_encoding::BASE64.encode(&self.public_key)
)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
#![allow(clippy::dbg_macro, clippy::print_stdout)]
use super::*;
#[test]
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
fn test() {
let rdata = DNSKEY::new(
true,
true,
false,
Algorithm::RSASHA256,
vec![0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7],
);
let mut bytes = Vec::new();
let mut encoder: BinEncoder<'_> = BinEncoder::new(&mut bytes);
assert!(rdata.emit(&mut encoder).is_ok());
let bytes = encoder.into_bytes();
println!("bytes: {bytes:?}");
let mut decoder: BinDecoder<'_> = BinDecoder::new(bytes);
let read_rdata = DNSKEY::read_data(&mut decoder, Restrict::new(bytes.len() as u16));
let read_rdata = read_rdata.expect("error decoding");
assert_eq!(rdata, read_rdata);
assert!(rdata
.to_digest(
&Name::parse("www.example.com.", None).unwrap(),
DigestType::SHA256
)
.is_ok());
}
#[test]
fn test_calculate_key_tag_checksum() {
let test_text = "The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog";
let test_vectors = vec![
(vec![], 0),
(vec![0, 0, 0, 0], 0),
(vec![0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff], 0xffff),
(vec![1, 0, 0, 0], 0x0100),
(vec![0, 1, 0, 0], 0x0001),
(vec![0, 0, 1, 0], 0x0100),
(test_text.as_bytes().to_vec(), 0x8d5b),
];
for &(ref input_data, exp_result) in test_vectors.iter() {
let result = DNSKEY::calculate_key_tag_internal(input_data);
assert_eq!(result, exp_result);
}
}
}